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Abstract
A potential reform of risk-adjusted deposit insurance pricing with forward contracts is 
presented.  We demonstrate that bank spread management itself may provide the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC’s) protection from credit and interest 
rate risks even though the bank’s spread decisions are made prior to the realization of 
those two risks.  But if the bank’s spread decisions are made subsequent to the 
realization of the credit and/or interest rate risks, the forward contracts may serve the 
FDIC for microhedging and/or macrohedging purposes.  Further, a decrease in the 
capital-to-deposits ratio decreases the FDIC’s going-concern insurance premium 
market value.  This paper suggests that capital regulation and bank spread 
management can also be important in influencing the FDIC’s hedging decisions.
Keywords: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Forward Contract, Credit Risk,
          Interest Rate Risk
JEL Classification: G21, G22
I.  Introduction
It has been recognized that bank and thrift failures and deposit insurance payouts 
have reached record highs in the last few years.  These plagues are the Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) has liabilities far in excess of its 
3assets, and even the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) faces threats to its 
solvency.  Following those failures and payouts, a number of reforms have been 
implemented under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
(FDICIA) of 1991.   Much literature concerning bank regulatory policies intends to 
manage moral hazard problems associated with deposit insurance and optimal 
regulatory design.1  The bank authority has emphasized capital adequacy rules, most 
in the form of risk-based capital requirements.  The insurer, e.g. the FDIC, has 
focused on the pricing and the feasibility of risk-adjusted insurance premiums.  The 
question is why have thrift and bank failures recently seem to be going from bad to 
worse.  A possible explanation demonstrated by Kling (1986) is that these failures 
reflect an increasingly risky economy, which in turn has increased the risk of bank 
portfolios.  
While the FDIC takes deliberate steps to curb problems with moral hazard, there 
are virtually no changes in the FDIC’s speculator position of “hedging” transactions 
in an increasingly risky economy.  Under these circumstances, the hedger (an insuree) 
is much more unwilling to bear risk, whereas the speculator (an insurer) is much less.  
The hedger is buying bank deposit insurance; the speculator is selling it.  As a 
hedger, hedging demand can immunize its balance sheet against unexpected changes; 
as a speculator, hedging supply cannot.  Thus, from a viewpoint of deregulation, it 
remains an open question whether limits on the FDIC’s speculator position could 
encourage greater “market discipline,” and keep the FDIC from facing threats to its 
                                                
1 As pointed out by Kupiec and O’Brien (1998), analyses have focused on uniform bank capital 
requirements, risk-based capital requirements, risk-adjusted priced insurance premium rates, and 
incentive-compatible designs.  Cecchetti (1999) demonstrated the moral hazard arising from 
government guarantees is one of the crucial justifications to address why we regulate financial 
intermediaries.
4solvency.
The option-theoretic analysis of deposit insurance pricing has assumed that when 
a bank is found to be insolvent, the FDIC can realize the full value of the bank’s 
assets (see Merton, 1977).  The value, the so-called “going-concern” value in 
Mullins and Pyle’s (1994) sense, realized by the FDIC at that time is assumed to be 
the value that would prevail if the bank had been found solvent and continued in 
operation.  However, we believe that realization of the going-concern value by the 
FDIC will not be possible for all bank assets.  Part of the overall program of risk 
management will accompany the transfer of assets from the insured bank to the FDIC 
in an increasingly risky economy.  If the FDIC is permitted to protect itself from 
losing through a counterbalancing transaction (e.g. permitting private insurers to 
provide full or supplemental coverage), facing threats to solvency may be expected to 
lessen.  This deregulated adoption of hedging may be treated as an important step in 
the direction of deposit-insurance potential reform to overcome the FSLIC and FDIC 
plagues mentioned above.  The purpose of this paper is to study the microhedging 
and macrohedging behavior of the FDIC, who faces a bank’s going-concern value, 
based on a simple firm-theoretic model under multiple sources of uncertainty in an 
option-theoretic analysis.2
The Black-Scholes (1973) approach is a powerful tool known as risk-neutral 
valuation.  The principal advantage of this approach is the explicit treatment of 
volatility, which has long played a prominent role in discussions of intermediary 
                                                
2 Transactions designed to hedge individual components of the balance sheet are referred to as 
microhedges, whereas those designed to protect the overall balance sheet are called macrohedges 
(Sinkey, Jr., 1992, p.482).  In this paper, microhedges occur when the asset and liability sides of bank 
5behavior.  This approach, however, omits a key aspect of a bank’s spread 
management, accordingly, the FDIC’s going-concern value in this paper.3  It is 
assumed that asset and deposit markets are perfectly competitive so that quantity 
setting is the relevant behavioral mode in both markets.  This assumption is not 
applicable to some loan markets since such markets are virtually always highly 
concentrated where banks, e.g. money-center banks mentioned in Zarruk and Madura 
(1992), set loan rates and face random loan levels.  As the spread is so important to 
bank profitability, the issue of how it is optimally determined in the Black-Scholes 
valuation faced by the FDIC deserves closer scrutiny.
As Finn and Frederick (1992) have noted, spread management in practice is done 
through a “cost of goods sold” approach in which deposits are the “material” and 
loans are the “work in process”.  Zarruk (1989), and Zarruk and Madura also 
provided firm-theoretic models to explain bank spread management.  Both papers 
looked at situations with only a single source of uncertainty: interest rate or funding 
risk as in Zarruk and credit risk as in Zarruk and Madura.  Applying a richer risk 
structure as in Wong (1997), this model features a bank facing both credit risk and 
interest rate risk, demonstrated by random loan levels and random deposit rates, 
respectively.  Loans are subject to non-performance because the bank does not know 
ex ante what proportion of its loans will perform.  A mismatching of asset rate 
sensitivities and liabilities occurs because the bank funds part of its fixed rate loans 
via variable rate deposits.  With reasonable assumptions about the bank’s underlying 
performance faced by the FDIC, the effects of spread management on microhedging 
                                                                                                                                           
operations are dichotomous (see Slovin and Sushka, 1983), whereas macrohedges occur when those of 
bank operations are simultaneous (see Krasa and Villamil, 1992, a , b).
3 According to Mercer (1992), earnings from the margin, or spread, between interest rates on assets 
6and macroheding are explored.
The results of this paper show how regulation, credit risk and interest risk 
conditions jointly determine the FDIC’s optimal hedging decisions.  We find that a 
bank’s spread management on its loan rate and deposit settings under the 
Black-Scholes valuation may provide the FDIC’s protection from credit risk when the 
FDIC prices risk-adjusted deposit insurance.  This spread management protection of 
credit risk obviates the need for forward market protection.  Furthermore, we 
demonstrate that a bank’s spread management may not provide the FDIC’s protection 
from interest risk.  Under these circumstances, the FDIC’s need for forward market 
protection of interest rate risk is suggested.
In this paper, we further argue that the absence of consistent evidence about the 
theory of normal backwardation is due to a model of loan-rate-setting behavior, which 
cannot be generalized to a model of quantity-setting behavior.  That the 
loan-rate-setting behavior in the FDIC’s going-concern valuation per se, and not 
merely a bank’s strategic competition, may lead to normal backwardation is the main 
concern of this paper.  The intuition behind this result is that the loan-rate-setting 
behavior of a bank may provide partial protection from credit and interest rate risks, 
but that this protection need not be symmetric with respect to those two risks.  The 
analysis in this paper can be viewed as a complement to the theory of normal 
backwardation and suggests that a bank’s strategic behavioral mode of loan-rate 
setting can also be important in influencing the FDIC’s hedging decisions.4
                                                                                                                                           
and interest rates on liabilities typically account for eighty percent or more of bank profits.
4 In this paper, the normal backwardation in loan quantity occurs when the forward loan quantity is 
less than the expected future spot quantity and the normal backwardation in deposit rate occurs when 
7The paper is organized as follows.  Pricing risk-adjusted deposit insurance 
under the Black-Scholes valuation of the FDIC is presented in Section II.  In Section 
III, the dichotomous and simultaneous behavioral modes of a loan-rate-setting and 
deposit-rate-taking bank faced by the FDIC address the issue: FDIC’s pricing and its 
hedging decisions.  In Section IV, the FDIC’s going-concern value and capital 
regulation to the bank is examined.  Section V contains the conclusions.
II.  The Model
The model in this paper illustrates the relationship between the FDIC’s 
going-concern spread value and its potential hedging.  To focus on the effect of the 
bank’s lending-borrowing money on the FDIC’s hedging, we consider a simple 
option-theoretic and firm-theoretic model under credit and interest rate risks.  We 
assume that a bank makes decisions in a single-period horizon.  At the beginning of 
the period, the bank raises D in deposits, K in equity and pays out P in an insurance 
premium.  Thus, the bank faces the following balance sheet:
PKDBL -+=+ (1)
where L  is the amount of loans and B  is the quantity of open market securities. 
The bank acts as a price taker in the open market so that the interest rate on the open 
                                                                                                                                           
the forward deposit rate is less than the expected future spot rate.
8market securities, R , is given.   The equity of the bank, K , is assumed to be fixed 
during the single period horizon, although it must satisfy the capital adequacy 
requirement by regulation, qDK ³ , where q  is the required minimum 
capital-to-deposits ratio. The required minimum capital-to-deposits ratio, q, can be 
made as in Zarruk and Madura (1992) since risk concerning the amount of loan loss 
arises from random loan defaults.  Accordingly, q is assumed to be an increasing 
function of L, 0>¶¶ Lq .
Loans granted by the bank belong to a single homogeneous class of fixed-rate
claims with one-period maturity.  The loan market is imperfect in the sense that the 
bank is a loan-rate setter and faces a downward-sloping loan demand function.   
Stigler (1964) originally points out banks that have market power in the asset market.  
Behavioral mode of loan-rate setting by banks is well documented by Hancock (1986).  
This assumption is utilized to analyze the issue of contingent claim in this paper.  
Uncertainty is introduced into the model of loan-rate-setting behavior as well.  
Applying Sealey (1980), we model that the random loan demand faced by the bank 
can be specified through the following demand function:
),( qLRLL = ,       0<¶¶ LRL  ,     0>¶¶ qL (2)
where q  is a random element, which is not known ex ante but has a known 
subjective probability distribution.  The random variable q  is assumed to vary over 
the range ¥<£ qa .  The lower limit of a for the random variable q must be 
such at 0³L .  Following Targgart and Greenbaum (1978), we assume that the 
bank’s lending doest not affect the distribution of q  so that the degree of uncertainty 
9per dollar of loans is constant.
Kling explains that bank and thrift failures simply reflect an increasingly risky 
economy; accordingly, interest rates have become more volatile, increasing the risk 
default of bank portfolios.  As pointed out by Neal (1996), one of the risks of making 
a bank loan is credit risk, the risk of borrower default.  Credit risk is generally 
influenced by both business cycles and firm-specific events.  We model this credit 
risky using q  to denote the possible non-performing loans.  At any time during a 
single period horizon, the value of the bank’s risky asset is:
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The promised security repayments to the bank at the end of the period are certain 
because of its risk-default characteristics.  The value of the earning-asset portfolio is:
)],()1)[(1(),(),( qqq LLL RLPDqRRVRA --+++= (4)
The deposit market is perfect in the sense that the bank is a deposit-rate taker 
where the supply of deposits is perfectly elastic.  However, deposits issued by the 
bank are assumed to have a maturity shorter than one period so that they must be 
operated at the unknown deposit rate, )(qDR , and 0>¶¶ qDR .  As the bank 
operates imperfectly competitive fixed-rate loans via perfectly competitive 
variable-rate deposits, it inevitably exposes itself to interest rate risk.  This is the 
reason why we model the random deposit rate specified through )(qDR .
if credit risk > 0
if credit risk = 0
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The cost structure of a bank is generally divided into two parts: financial costs 
(e.g. the interest cost of deposits) and operative costs (e.g. variable cost of wages and 
fixed cost of capital equipment).  The bank’s random end-of-period interest costs for 
deposits is DRD ))(1( q+ .  The total costs at the end of period are then given using:
)()),(())(1( DCRLCPDRZ DLLD ++++= qq (5)
where LC  and DC  denote the variable costs of servicing loans and deposits, 
respectively.5  It is assumed that 0>¶¶ LCL , 0
22 >¶¶ LCL , 0>¶¶ DCD , and 
0
22 >¶¶ DCD .
Let us derive the value of the bank’s equity at the end of the period as a function 
of the residual value of the bank after meeting all of its obligations.  The term 
,max{ ZA- 0} indicates the bank’s equity value.  However, if the bank is not able to 
meet all of its obligations, the FDIC pays out Z-A; hence, ,max{ AZ - 0}.  
Following Mullins and Pyle, define ,max{ ZAS -= 0} to be the Black and Scholes’ 
value of the call option effectively purchased by the equity holders of the bank.  
Similarly, define ,max{ AZP -= 0} to be the Black and Scholes’ value of the put 
option, written on the bank’s earning-asset portfolio and with an exercise price equal 
to the promised payments to the depositors, which the FDIC has effectively written to 
                                                
5 The fixed cost of the bank is omitted for simplicity because the inclusion of this cost complicates the 
model without changing the results of the model.  Furthermore, we assumed that the variable costs of 
servicing loans and deposits are separable.  This assumption is frequently utilized in the literature.  
See, for example, Sealey (1980).
11
the equity-holders of the bank.  We impose two conditions on the model:
)(),( 1, dNRVSMax LDRL
q= (6-1)
       )()]}()1)[(1({ 2, dNeRLPDqRZ L
mq ---++--
)(),()()]}()1)[(1({ 12, dNRVdNeRLPDqRZP LL -----++-=
- qq m (6-2)
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N(‧) is the cumulative density of a standard normal random variable. sˆ  is the 
standard deviation of the rates of return on the bank’s earning-asset portfolios. vs
and 1s  are the standard deviation of the returns on the risky and default-free assets, 
respectively. v,1r is the instantaneous correlation coefficient between the two assets 
in the bank’s portfolio. m  is the deposit spread, which is defined as the spread 
between the risk-free rate and the promised rate on deposits.  Suppose that the bank 
maximizes the expected equity values.  Then the bank selects LR and D to maximize 
the expectation of the equity value.  Initially, the deposit insurance premium is 
actuarially fair with the conditions of 0=¶¶ LRS and 0=¶¶ DS .    Given the 
optimal loan rate and deposit amount, the FDIC then pays out the optimal going 
concern value of (Z-A) if the bank is not able to meet all of its obligations.  
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III. FDIC’s Pr icing and Forward Contacts
It may first be noted that, at the time of entering into the insurance contract, the 
FDIC is concerned with the future stochastic behavior of the bank’s assets because 
once the insurance is contracted, the FDIC insures out-of-pocket expenses if the 
terminal value of the bank’s assets after insurance is less than its liabilities.  Second,
the deposit insurance premium does not depend directly on the risk-free spread rate.  
Hence, the spread management can indirectly affect the cost of deposit insurance via 
its effects on two of the premium’s direct determinates: the bank’s loan rate setting 
and the deposit market rate.  As the FDIC is aware of those two uncertain 
determinates, it faces both credit and interest rate risks due to not realizing the full 
value of the bank’s assets and liabilities.  A forward market may have a viable role 
in hedging the credit and interest rate risks when one of the components of the bank’s 
spread management is asymmetric, provided the FDIC is permitted to hedge the asset/ 
liability imbalance at the time it enters into the insurance contract.  Applying O’Hara 
(1985), we consider when the FDIC, who faces the going-concern value of a bank’s 
spread management would prefer to “lock in” loan quantity and/or deposit rate by 
entering a forward contract, or to wait and accept these uncertain quantity and/or rate 
that will prevail in the spot market.  Furthermore, applying Hicks (1946), we define 
the FDIC’s purchasing loan at an optimal rate determined by the bank via a forward 
contract to be short hedging and selling deposit at a rate determined by the market via 
a forward contract to be long hedging. 
13
  In the following section, the FDIC’s credit risk microhedging is conducted 
when the deposit is fixed and interest rate risk microhedging is done when the loan 
rate is pre-determined.  These two dichotomous results are obtained for two reasons.  
First, bank spread management itself frequently encounters situations where loan-rate 
decisions must be made in the presence of fixed deposit rates and where deposit 
decisions must be made in the presence of fixed loan rates.  Sealey, and Slovin and 
Sushka (1983) have modeled those dichotomous modes of financial behavior.  
However, Krasa and Villamil (1992, a, b) argue that the bank’s problem clearly 
embodies optimization by all agents (borrower-intermediary-lender in their models) in
the economy.  Accordingly, those results are used in a later section when the 
simultaneous effects of credit and interest rate risks are analyzed. 
The optimal deposit insurance premium is equation (6-2) with the first-order 
conditions calculated from equation (6-1).  The following proposition characterizes 
the properties of equation (6-2).
Proposition 1: Let ),( DRLS  be the bank’s current market value during the period 
horizon with 0=¶¶ LRS and 0=¶¶ DS , then 
(i) ),( DRLP  is strictly concave in L  if the bank’s equity maximization is made 
both prior and subsequent to the realization of )(qL .
(ii) ),( DRLP  is strictly convex in DR  if the bank’s equity maximization is made 
prior to the realization of )(qDR .
(iii) ),( DRLP  is convex in DR  if the bank’s equity maximization is made 
14
subsequent to the realization of )(qDR with 0)1()( >+-+¶¶ BRZRDD D .
Proof: Given the timing of part (i), LR  is a number since the bank’s equity 
maximization is made prior to the realization of )(qL .  Thus, 0<¶¶ LP  and 
022 >¶¶ LP .  But if the bank’s equity maximization is made subsequent to the 
realization of )(qL , LR  is a function of L . 0<¶¶ LP  and 0
22 >¶¶ LP  are 
obtained as well.  Accordingly, strict concavity is verified.  Part (ii) follows 
symmetrically from part (i).  D is a number if the bank’s equity maximization is 
made prior to the realization of )(qDR .  Thus, 0>¶¶ DRP  and 0
22 >¶¶ DRP .
Strictly convexity is verified.  In the case of being subsequent to the realization of 
)(qDR , D is a function of DR .  0>¶¶ DRP  if 0)1()( >+-+¶¶ BRZRDD D , 
22
DRP ¶¶  indeterminate.  Thus, part (iii) is stated. 
Proposition 1 illustrates the relationships between a bank’s spread management 
of credit and interest rate risks and the FDIC’s going concern deposit insurance 
premium market value.  If the bank cannot know the realization of )(qL  before its 
operation, the part (i) indicates that the FDIC’s current market value of insurance 
premium, written on the bank’s assets and with an exercise price equal to the 
promised payments to the depositors, is nonlinearly affected by loan quantity changes.  
This occurs even though a constant optimal loan rate remains and the premium value 
can only vary with loan-quantity levels.
The shape of the premium value function of the put option has important 
implications for the FDIC’s forward market decisions.  As part (i) indicates, the 
15
premium value function is strictly concave in the loan quantity; however, this is no 
longer the forward market equilibrium.  This concavity means that the FDIC actually 
prefers loan quantity variability.  To induce the FDIC to purchase loan forward, the 
forward loan quantity would have to be less than the expected future spot loan 
quantity.  Therefore, the FDIC is, at worst, indifferent to the loan quantity risk and it 
has no reason to lock in a loan quantity whether or not the bank can know the 
realization of )(qL .
Similarly, if the bank cannot know the realization of )(qDR  before its deposits 
are absorbed, then part (ii) indicates that the premium value is nonlinearly affected by 
deposit rates changes even though a constant remains, optimal deposits are fixed.  
The shape of the premium value function of the put option is strictly convex in 
)(qDR , which indicates that there is no longer the forward market equilibrium.  This 
is because the FDIC prefers deposit rate variability.  To induce the FDIC to sell 
deposit forward, the forward deposit rate would have to exceed the expected future 
spot deposit rate.  Accordingly, the FDIC is, at worst, indifferent to the deposit rate 
risk and it has no reason to lock the deposit rate.  To summarize, we have the 
following corollary.
Corollary 1: If a bank’s spread management is made prior to the realization of 
)(qL or )(qDR , the forward market equilibrium of the FDIC premium value cannot 
occur.
If the bank can know the realization of )(qL  before its operation, the optimal 
loan rate to set for each loan quantity realization can be selected.  The FDIC’s 
16
premium value will vary accordingly because of loan-rate changes.  Loan-rate shifts 
indicate that different loan quantity levels have different, nonlinear effects on the 
going-concern premium value.  The interpretation of this result follows a similar 
argument as in the case of not knowing the credit risk.
But if the bank can know )(qDR , part (iii) states that the premium value 
function is nonlinearly affected by the deposit rate changes under the limitation of 
0)1()( >+-+¶¶ BRZRDD D .  If the optimal deposit quantity to determine for 
each deposit rate realization can be selected, the premium value will vary because of 
the deposit quantity changes.  Given the above mathematical limitations, we can 
argue that there is no longer the forward market equilibrium in the case of the 
realization of )(qDR  and the following corollary is established.
Corollary 2: If a bank’s spread management is made subsequent to the realization of 
)(qL , a similar argument as corollary 1 occurs; if made subsequent to the realization 
of )(qDR , a forward market equilibrium cannot occur under 
0)1()( >+-+¶¶ BRZRDD D .
Spread management allows a money-center bank, which is assumed to be a 
loan-rate-setting and deposit-rate-taking bank in this model, to have a much freer 
hand about the completion of lending business than about its acquisition of borrowing 
business.  A related question to consider is the impact of a bank’s spread 
management on the FDIC’s imbalance in long and short hedging.  To resolve this 
problem, an idea due to Hicks (1946, p.137) is utilized to develop an anticipatory 
microhedging strategy specific to bank credit and interest rate risks for the FDIC.  
17
This idea is that if forward markets consist entirely of hedgers, there will always be a 
tendency for a planned weakness on the supply side and accordingly, a smaller 
proportion of planned sales than planned purchases will be involved by forward 
contacts.  An implication of these conditions is that the spread management may be 
sufficient to an imbalance in long and short microhedging  
Spread management, however, may not be necessary to generate this 
microhedging imbalance.  The bank’s mode of loan-rate-setting behavior may be 
sufficient to induce differential microhedging.  This can be demonstrated by 
incorporating some additional properties of the going concern spread management 
and credit value and interest rate into the model.  According to the analyses of 
corollary 1 and 2, the FDIC is, at worst, indifferent to credit and interest rate risks and 
it has no reason to lock in those risks.  A forward market equilibrium characterized 
by a normal backwardation cannot occur.  The institution behind this anticipatory 
result is that bank spread management faced by the FDIC may have already provided 
partial protection from credit and interest rate risks, but this protection may not be 
symmetric with respect to loan non-performance and deposit rate volatilities.  
Consequently, we establish the following corollary.
Corollary 3: If a bank’s spread management faced by the FDIC is made prior to the 
realization of )(qL  and subsequent to the realization of )(qDR , a forward market 
equilibrium characterized by normal backwardation cannot occur if 
0)1()( >+-+¶¶ BRZRDD D .
Based on the dichotomous results of the previous analyses, it is now possible to 
18
determine the FDIC’s simultaneous influence of macrohedging on loan and deposit 
rate decisions.  One implication of the simultaneous determination is that timing 
differences of the financial intermediation faced by the FDIC may not be sufficient to 
generate an imbalance in long and short macrohedging.
If loans are known in advance of the financial intermediation faced by the FDIC 
than are deposit rates, then the current market value of the premium will be strictly 
concave in L  but unknown in DR .  This means that the FDIC will not be willing 
to hedge loans and may or may not be willing to hedge deposit rates.  But if deposit 
rates are known in advance of the financial intermediation than loans, then the 
premium value function will be strictly convex in DR  but concave in L .  This 
implies that the FDIC will not be willing to hedge deposit rates as well as loans.  
Under these circumstances, if hedgers are present in forward markets, the two 
imbalances would not induce normal backwardadation.
Corollary 4: If the FDIC’s current deposit insurance premium market value is priced 
prior to the realization of )(qL  and )(qDR  simultaneously, the forward market 
equilibrium cannot occur.
The interpretation of the following two corollaries follows a similar argument as 
in the case of the dichotomous determination.  Thus, the simultaneous results are 
consistent with the dichotomous results.  Our fining provides a complement to the 
more extensive analyses of Krasa and Villamil, and Slovin and Sushka on the 
19
existence of simulteaneous/dichotomous determination.6
Corollary 5: If the FDIC’s current market value of deposit insurance premium is 
priced subsequently to the realization of )(qL  and )(qDR  simultaneously, a 
forward market equilibrium characterized by the normal backwardation is possible.
Corollary 6: If the FDIC’s current insurance deposit market value is priced prior to the 
realization of )(qL  and subsequent to the realization of )(qDR , a similar argument 
as Corollary 5 is present.
IV.  FDIC’s Pr icing and Capital Regulation
As pointed out by Zarruk and Madura, asset quality problems have plagued 
banks in recent years.  Money-center banks have experienced financial problems due 
to their exposure to less-developed-country debt.  Concerns about bank asset quality 
and failures have prompted regulatory authorities to adopt a risk-based system of 
capital standards, which forces a bank capital position to reflect its asset portfolio risk.  
This section examines the relationship between capital regulation and the FDIC’s 
premium value.  Our result is allowed to address a crucial issue: what is the most 
likely effect of the risk-based capital guidelines on the FDIC’s premium value?
                                                
6 As mentioned, Krasa and Villamil (1992, a, b) argued that the problem clearly embodies optimization 
by all agents (borrower-intermediary-lender in their models) in the economy.  Slovin and Sushka 
(1983, p. 1586) argue that “Over all, the asset and liability sides of bank operations are dichotomized.” 
and “ When the constraint binds, …  , and the dichotomy between the asset and liability sides of bank 
operations is broken.”
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Consider the impact on the FDIC’s premium value from changes in the 
capital-to-deposits ratio, q.  Implicit differentiation of equation (6-2) with respect to 
q yields 
02)1( >++=¶¶ RDRqP (7)
Proposition 2: When deposits are insured, an increase (a decrease) in the 
capital-to-deposits ratio increases (decreases) the FDIC’s current market value of 
deposit insurance premium.
The interpretation of this proposition is straightforward.  As the bank is forced 
to its capital relative to its deposit level, it must now provide a return to a larger equity 
base.  As the value of the bank’s assets is less than the promised payments to the 
depositors, the FDIC pays out the difference.  A larger equity implies a lower 
insurance payment; accordingly, a higher current market value for the FDIC’s 
premium.
Furthermore, as shown in Keeley (1991), the rise in bank and thrift failures may 
reflect the secular decline in capital-to-assets ratio in recent years.7  There are two 
possible reasons: lower capital, holding earning-asset risk constant, leads to less 
protections against failure; lower capital ratios increase the incentives for banks to 
increased asset risk.  Those two reasons may explain why banks and thrifts allow the 
bankruptcy risk to increase, which in turn causes the FDIC to decrease its current 
insurance premium market value.  As Keeley has shown, increased competition may 
                                                
7 A similar result can be explained by capital-to-deposits ratio (see Zarruk and Madura, 1992). 
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have reduced bank’s incentives to act prudently with regard to risk taking.  Under 
this circumstance, banks would have a greater incentive to increase earning-asset 
portfolio risk due to the decline in capital ratios.  An implication of Proposition 2 is 
that the above argument in turn results in decreasing the FDIC’s current insurance 
premium market value.  Thus, this Proposition provides an extensive explanation for 
Keeley’s observation. 
V.  Conclusions
From the viewpoint of potential deregulation, this paper has presented the 
FDIC’s forward market decisions on its going-concern pricing risk-adjusted deposit 
insurance value.  The distinguishing characteristic of the model presented in this 
paper is that loan-rate-setting behavior (and thus spread management), credit (loan 
quantity) risk, and interest (deposit rate) risk under the Black-Scholes valuation are 
simultaneously incorporated into the model.  Based on a reasonable view of 
microhedging and marcohedging decisions making and current deposit insurance 
pricing arrangements, it seems unlikely that the omission of any of the above aspects 
of the FDIC’s hedging behavior can be justified.  More importantly, these 
considerations play a crucial role in determining the FDIC’s going-concern value for a 
bank’s loan rate (and thus its optimal earning-asset portfolio) and deposit decisions 
under the Black-Scholes valuation.  Earlier models of hedging on the risk-adjusted 
deposit insurance pricing that ignore these considerations are incomplete and many of 
their implications cannot be extended to models based on more general assumptions.
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Our model shows that a bank’s spread management on its loan rate and deposit 
settings may provide the FDIC protection from credit and interest rate risks when the 
FDIC prices its risk-adjusted deposit insurance.  This spread management protection 
obviates the need for forward market protection even if the bank cannot know the 
realization of those two risks either dichotomously or simultaneously.  If the bank 
can know only the realization of the credit risk, the spread management protection 
obviates the need for forward market protection as well.  But if the bank can know 
only the interest rate risk, the FDIC’s forward market microhedging and 
marcohedging decision on interest rate risk may be necessary.  The asymmetric 
microhedging and macrohedging on credit and interest rate risks stem from a bank’s 
loan-rate-setting and deposit-rate-taking behavioral modes faced by the FDIC.  It has 
been shown, for example, that a crucial Sealey, Jr.’s conclusion (1980, p.1152): “that 
many of the results concerning the theory of financial intermediation derives from 
models of quantity-setting behavior cannot be generalized to models of rate-setting 
behavior” is supported by our arguments in this paper.  Furthermore, we have 
demonstrated that the theory of normal backwardation on the FDIC’s microhedging 
and marcohedging forward loan and deposit rate may or may not be supported, 
depending on the bank’s interest rate risk realization.  Nevertheless, by focusing 
strictly on a bank’s loan-rate-setting behavioral mode, this paper demonstrates the 
crucial link between rate setting and hedging behavioral modes on pricing 
risk-adjusted deposit insurance.
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